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BRIEF OF APPELLEES
JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a final judgment of the Third Judicial District Court for Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, Honorable John Paul Kennedy. This Court has jurisdiction in
this matter pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §78-2-2(4) and UT. R. APP. P. 3.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS. STATEMENT OF
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL. AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
ISSUE I:

Did the trial court err in denying Appellants pre-judgment and postjudgment interest?

STANDARD OF REVIEW: Prejudgment interest may be recovered where the
damage is complete, the amount of the loss is fixed as of a particular time, and the loss is
measurable by facts and figures. Conia v. Wilcox. 898 P.2d 1379, 1387 (Utah 1985).
-1-

Generally, a "decision to grant or deny prejudgment interest presents a question of law which
we review for correctness." Id. However, when the trial court applies the facts of the case
to the law then the question is a mixed question of fact and law, and the factual basis
underpinning the decision is subject to a clearly erroneous standard. State v. Pena. 869 P.2d
932, 945-36 (Utah 1994).
ISSUE II:

Did the trial court properly deny Appellants the ability to foreclose on
the subject property?

STANDARD OF REVIEW: As it pertains to a challenge to the trial court's statutory
lien, this Court said it is "not bound to substitute our judgment for that of the trial court, and
because of its advantaged position we give considerable deference to its findings and
judgment." Baker v. Hansen. 666 P.2d 315,318 (Utah 1983), c/f/ftgReamv.Fitzen. 581 P.2d
145, 147 (Utah 1978).
ISSUE III: Did the trial court properly award damages to Appellees in theform of
an offset?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "Because the adequacy of damages is a question of
fact, the reviewing court cannot overturn the trial court's findings unless they are clearly
erroneous." Aris Vision Institute. Inc. v. Wasatch Property Management Inc.. 2005 UT App
326, f 18,121 P.3d 24, citing In re Estate of Knickerbocker. 912 P.2d 969,981 (Utah 1996).
"Appellate courts will presume trial courts' award of damages to be correct and will overturn
it only if it is clearly erroneous with no reasonable support in evidence." Forsberg v.
Burningham & Kimball 892 P.2d 23 (Utah App. 1995). The Utah Court of Appeals reviews
"the trial court's decision to award damages under a standard which gives the court
-2-

considerable discretion, and will not disturb its ruling absent an abuse of discretion." Shar's
Cars. L.L.C. v. Elder. 2004 UT App 258,113,97 P.3d 724 citing Lynsenko v. Sawava. 1999
UT App 31, ^6,973 P.2d 445. "In fixing damages, trial court is vested with broad discretion,
and award will not be set aside unless it is manifestly unjust or indicates that the trial court
neglected pertinent elements, or was unduly influenced by prejudice or other extraneous
circumstances." Mabev v. Kay Peterson Const. Co.. Inc. 682 P.2d 287 (Utah 1984). "When
a reasonable basis exists for the trial court's award of damages, Court of Appeals will affirm
the damage award on appeal." Lefavi v. Bertoch. 2000 UT App 5,994 P.2d 817.
ISSUE IV: Are Appellants entitled to an increased attorneys 'fees award should
they prevail on appeal?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Determination of reasonable fees is in sound discretion
of the trial court because of its familiarity with litigation, attorneys and attorney fees in
general. Salmon v. Davis County. 916 P.2d 890, 892, 898 (Utah 1996). Because the Court
of Appeals is not in an "advantaged position" to make such determinations, [it is afforded]
considerably less discretion." see, State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 936, 938-40 (Utah 1994).
"The appellate court is entrusted with ensuring legal accuracy and uniformity and should
defer to the trial court on factual matters" such as an award of attorneys fees. Willev v.
Willev. 951 P.2d 226,230-231 (Utah 1997).
DETERMINATIVE CONSITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
A.

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

B.

UTAH CONSTITUTION
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C.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§15-1-1(2005)

D.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§15-1-4 (2005)

E.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§38-1-15(2005)

F.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§78-22-1 (2005)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On August 2,2005, this matter came before the Honorable John Paul Kennedy for the
purpose of a bench trial on the issues in the complaint ("Complaint'') filed October 17,2003,
by Ron Case Roofing ("Appellants") regarding the property at Lot 1, Lakewood #6, SUB.
ParcelNo. 22-16-206-011-0000 or 1849 East 5600 South, Salt Lake City, Utah ("Property")
which is a property owned by Peggy Ann Sturzenegger and Clarence Gene Sturzenegger
("Appellees")- The Complaint alleges that "the property is the subject of a mechanic's lien
foreclosure action herein arising out ofRon Case Roofing's having performed certain roofing
work, at the request of Peggy Sturzenegger, for which Ron Case Roofing has not been paid
in fall." (Rec. p. 3, f6) Appellants alleged the first cause of action as a breach of contract
(Rec. p. 3), the second cause of action as unjust enrichment/quantum Meruit, and the fourth
cause of action1 as foreclosure of lien (Rec. p. 4).
On or around April 14, 2003, the parties entered into a contract in which the
Appellants agreed to complete roofing work for the Appellees at the Property. During the
course of the work commencing, the ceiling of the master bedroom was damaged by the

appellant's Complaint does not state a third cause of action. Appellee has cited to the
document as it is in the record.
-4-

employees of Ron Case Roofing. Appellee hired another company to fix the damage to the
ceiling of the master bedroom and the cost do so was contested by the Appellants. The
contested issues came for trial before Honorable John Paul Kennedy on August 2,2004..
On October 13,2005, the Honorable John Paul Kennedy entered the Final Judgment
(the "Judgment") in favor of Ron Case Roofing against Appellees for the following; (1)
principal in the amount of $10,264.00; (2) costs in the amount of $487.65; and (3) attorney
Fees in the amount of $10,000.00. Furthermore, the trial court determined that Appellants
were the prevailing party. Appellees satisfied the Judgment in full on the date it was entered.
On or around October 20,2005, Appellants filed their Motion to Reconsider Amount
of Attorneys Fees included in FinalJudgement, asking the trial court to amend the amount
of the attorney fees awarded at trial. On January 9, 2006, the trial court denied the
Appellants' motion, deeming the judgment final.
On or around January 25, 2006, Appellants filed their Notice of Appeal from the
Judgment. On February 15,2006, Appellants filed their Docketing Statement with the Utah
Court of Appeals, challenging the trial courts' refusal to award pre-judgment and postjudgment interest at the rate expressly specified in the subject contract, the trial courts'
refusal to allow Ron Case Roofing to foreclosure on the subject property, the trial courts'
awarding damages in the form of an offset; the trial courts' reduction of cost of the sheeting
materials, and the trial courts' reduction of attorneys fees. Appellants briefed the issues
contained in their docketing statement.

-5-

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or around November 19,2002, Appellants met with Appellees at the Property and
provided them with a proposal for roof work, specifically for an entire tar and gravel roof,
new rain gutters, new vents, color coated metal. The original bid was for a total of
$12,450.00. (Tr. p. 8-9). On or around April 14 2003, the Appellees signed the contract by
Ron Case Roofing and payed a $6000.00 down payment. As a result, the work commenced
shortly thereafter. (Tr. P. 13, lines 5-8).
Appellants encountered a problem during the course of their work. Respecting the
section of the roof over the master bedroom of the Property, they discovered that the nails
were damaging the ceiling of the master bedroom due to it having a vaulted tongue and
groove ceiling to that particular part of the roof. Appellants testified that they were unaware
of the vaulted tongue and groove ceiling due to the Appellees failing to inform them of such
roof. (Tr. P. 10, lines 25; p. 11, lines 1-3). However, by the Appellants' own admission, he
just "assumed it was just one layer of roofing." (Tr. P. 5, lines 11-13)
During the course of providing the Appellants with a new roof, the roofers also
encountered an old gravel roof stuck to the sheeting boards. Appellants testified that 4,000
square feet out of 4,600 square feet were in this condition, which required extra work to be
undertaken to remove the prior roof. The photographs taken by Appellants of the multiple
roofs failed to establish for the trial court that it was the Appellees9 residence. By Shane
Case's own testimony, he did not even think to take photos that would identify the location
of the photos taken (Tr. P. 68, lines 15-25). Appellants removed all of the layers of the
-6-

roofing materials from the Property (Tr. P. 17-18). Moreover, they proceeded doing this
without obtaining permissionfromAppellees.
Appellants claimed that Appellees did not provide him with any phone numbers, but
admits when asked that he had attempted to call them (Tr. P. 19, lines 18-21). Furthermore,
Appellants admitted to contacting Appellees maybe "once or twice" during the months
between the time of his giving her the proposal and her signing it, evidencing that he had
sufficient contact information (Tr. P. 40-41).
Peggy Sturzenegger testified that she left for Hawaii without letting them know where
she was or when she would return due to the fact that she had been robbed twice in the past
five (5) years, and thus did not want to risk that happening again. (Tr. P. 143-144). Shane
Case testified that he did not inform Ms. Sturzenegger that she had multiple roofs before
commencing removal of the prior roof (Tr. P. 50, lines 6-7). Appellants testified that they
commenced work under paragraph 13 of the Contract, which states as follows:
If a problem should arise and workmen cannot contact Customer, Contractor
will proceed with job utilizing Contractor's best judgement. In the event that
additional costs are incurred by Contractor under these circumstances,
Customer authorizes Contractor to proceed with the project and agrees to pay
any increase in costs.
{See Appellant's brief, Addendum). Appellant, Shane Case testified that he included the
provisions in the contract to continue working when unable to reach a customer (Tr. P. 57,
lines 20-24). Appellants further testified that they did not notify the buyer of the provisions
on the back page of the contract, nor do they regularly practice informing customers that
there is a list of the provisions on it. (Tr. P. 47, lines 9-18). Furthermore, that he did not in
-7-

any way inform Appellees that there was a chance of a second roof. (Tr. P. 50, lines 5-14).
Appellants testified that they did not provide the Appellees with any notice that there may
be differences in the bid that could only be known if he were to be allowed access to
visually inspecting the inside of her house, although testimony was provided that Appellants
should have recognized that there was possibly an anomaly that needed to be determined.
(Tr. P. 58-59).
During the course of the work commencing, the ceiling of the master bedroom was
damaged by the employees of Ron Case Roofing. Appellees counsel sent numerous letters
to Ron Case Roofing asking them to repair the damage to the master bedroom ceiling. (Tr.
P. 191, lines 12-16; exhibits 35 and 36). Appellees contracted with Scorpion of Salt Lake
to repair the damage because she did not approve of the offer Ron Case Roofing had made
her to complete the repairs. (Tr. P. 137, lines 1-22). Appellees had to pay Scorpion a fee of
$3000.00 to complete the repairs on the master bedroom ceiling that was damaged by
Appellants (Tr. P. 138, line 15).
When Ron Case Roofing had completed the original work agreed upon as well as the
additional work, the final invoice amount totaled $16,578.00 (Tr. P. 30, line 6). Appellants
appeared at the Appellees house and forcefully shoved the contract at her with all these
added expenses and demanded that she sign them, and she refused to do such thing and
informed him that she did not desire to speak with him. At that point, he informed her not
to contact an attorney, that they could work things out between them. (Tr. P. 144, lines 2025 & p. 145, lines 1-7).
-8-

On October 17,2003, Ron Case Roofing filed a Complaint in this matter in the Third
Judicial District Court, alleging breach of contract by the Appellees in this matter.
Moreover, on June 13,2003, a mechanic's lien was placed on the Property at issue in these
proceedings pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §38-1-1.
On August 2, 2004, this matter came before the Honorable John Paul Kennedy for
the purpose of a bench trial. During the course of the trial, Appellants' expert witness who
had previously worked for Ron Case Roofing and twice testified for them (Tr. P. 176, lines
11-19), admitted that contractors should limit their liability in their contracts when it comes
to damages. (Tr. P. 167, lines 15-21). The same expert then testified that he believed that
Ron Case Roofing is responsible for the ceiling damage in the master bedroom in this
matter. (Tr. P. 168, line 11-15). The expert witness for Appellees testified that the first page
of the contract of Ron Case Roofing is rather common; however, the second page with all
ofthe stipulations and liability information "is quite unique to Ron Case Roofing." (Tr. 215216). On October 13, 2005, Judge Kennedy entered the Judgment in favor of Ron Case
Roofing against Appellees for the following; (1) principal in the amount of $10,264.00; (2)
Costs in the amount of $487.65; and (3) Attorney Fees in the amount of $10,000.00.
Furthermore, the trial court determined the Appellants as the prevailing party. Appellees
satisfied the Judgment in full on the date it was entered.
On or around October 20,2005, Appellants filed their Motion to Reconsider Amount
of Attorneys Fees included in Final Judgement, asking the trial court to amend the amount
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of the attorney fees awarded at trial. On January 9, 2006, the trial court denied the
Appellants' motion, deeming the Judgment final.
On or around January 25, 2006, Appellants filed their Notice of Appeal from the
Judgment. OnFebruary 15,2006, Appellants filedtheir Docketing Statement with the Utah
Court of Appeals, challenging the trial courts' refusal to award pre-judgment and postjudgment interest at the rate expressly specified in the subject contract; the trial courts'
refusal to allow Ron Case Roofing to foreclosure on the subject property, the trial courts'
awarding damages in the form of an offset, the trial courts' reduction of cost of the sheeting
materials and the trial courts' reduction of attorneys fees. Appellants briefed the issues
contained in their docketing statement.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Utah Supreme Court has specifically indicated that it will decline to address a
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence if an appellant fails to meet its burden of
marshaling because they ". . .merely restate[] or review[] the evidence that supports an
alternate finding or a finding contrary to the trial court's established finding of fact." Wilson
Supply, Inc. v. Fradan Mfg. Corp., 2002 UT 94, 54 P.3d 1177. In the instant matter,
Appellants have failed to marshal any of the evidence to contradict the trial court's finding
that it was without sufficient evidence to award prejudgment or postjudgment interest. As
such, this Court should decline to address such a challenge.
Alternatively, the trial court is given a large amount of discretion in determining an
award of prejudgment or postjudgment interest. The Utah Supreme Court has previously
-10-

held that the denial of prejudgment interest is appropriate when the action is for equitable
relief in cases involving the invocation of foreclosure and enforcement of a contract, since
".. .consideration of the principles of equity [] address themselves to the conscience and
discretion of the trial court." Bellon v. Malnar. 808 P.2d 1089, 1097 (Utah 1991), citing
Fullmer v. Blood. 546 P.2d 606, 610 (Utah 1976). Further, any claim as to postjudgment
interest is moot by the fact that Appellees satisfied the Judgment on the date that it was
entered. Appellants have failed to show how the trial court abused its discretion in denying
prejudgment and postjudgment interest in a matter pertaining to the principles of equity.
A basic principal pertaining to civil litigation is that a defendant to an action may
raise any issue and assert any defense which will operate to defeat a plaintiffs claim. See,
Stewart Livestock Co. v. Ostler. 144 P.2d 276 (Utah 1943); see also, UT. R. CIV. P. 12 and
13. More particularly in foreclosure actions, a defendant may plead defenses by way of
offset or counterclaims, and a defendant should be permitted to offset any and all damages
they may reasonably have sustained through the contractor's work. Stewart Livestock at
281. The Utah Supreme Court has long held that a trial courts' decision to refuse
foreclosure in matters will only occur if the trial courts' decisions are arbitrary or capricious.
Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. Neilson. 26 Utah 2d 383,490 P.2d 328 (Utah 1971). As stated
supra, the foreclosure issue argued by Appellants in their brief is also moot by the fact that
Appellees satisfied the Judgment in full on the date that it was entered. The trial court's
determination to offset the Judgment was neither arbitrary nor capricious and was properly
undertaken in consideration of the evidence presented at trial.
-11-

The Utah Court of Appeals reviews 'the trial court's decision to award damages
under a standard which gives the court considerable discretion, and will not disturb its ruling
absent an abuse of discretion." Shar's Cars. L.L.C. v. Elder, 2004 UT App 258, fl 3,97 P.3d
724 citing Lynsenko v. Sawava. 1999 UT App 31, f6, 973 P.2d 445. "In fixing damages,
trial court is vested with broad discretion, and award will not be set aside unless it is
manifestly unjust or indicates that the trial court neglected pertinent elements, or was unduly
influenced by prejudice or other extraneous circumstances." Mabey v. Kay Peterson Const.
Co.. Inc. 682 P.2d 287 (Utah 1984). "When a reasonable basis exists for the trial court's
award of damages, Court of Appeals will affirm the damage award on appeal." Lefavi v.
Bertoch. 2000 UT App 5,994 P.2d 817. As argued further below, a reasonable basis existed
for the trial court to award the damages in the manner set forth in the Judgment. The
Appellants have failed to overcome the trial court's broad discretion in this area and the
damage award should thus be affirmed on appeal.
In Willey v. Willey. the Utah Supreme Court overturned this Court's determination
as to attorneys fees and remanded the issue to the trial court for their analysis, finding that
appellate courts should defer the issue to ensure legal accuracy and uniformity. Ibid., 951
P.2d 226,230-231 (Utah 1997). Case law supports the award of attorneys' fees on appeal
where the prevailing party at trial also prevails on appeal, but it appears to only be in
instances where the prevailing party was required to defend themselves. Appellants
prevailed in the trial court where Appellees were required to defend themselves. Appellants
then appealed their decision, having been dissatisfied with the Judgment, and again required
-12-

Appellees to incur the cost of again defending themselves on appeal. Appellants should not
be awarded attorneys fees on appeal since they received an adequate Judgment in the trial
court for their claims.
ARGUMENT
I.

TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO AWARD PRE-JUDGMENT
INTEREST AND POST-JUDGMENT INTEREST.
A.

Appellants Failed to Marshal the Evidence Against the Trial Court's Findings
That There Was Insufficient Evidence to Support an Award of Prejudgment
or Postjudgment Interest.

UT. R. APP. P. 24(a)(9) states that "[a] party challenging a fact finding must first
marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding." Recently, the Utah
Supreme Court held that "[m]arshaling evidence in support of the ultimate finding is a
prerequisite to a challenge to it.9' Parduhn v. Bennett. 2005 UT 22,112 P.3d 495. The Utah
Supreme Court has also held that "[a] party must marshal all of the evidence supportive of
the verdict in its opening brief.'9 Harding v. BelL 2002 UT 108, 57 P.3d 1093.
The Utah Supreme Court defined the marshaling requirement, stating that
"specifically, our marshaling rule requires plaintiffs to 'marshal all the evidence in favor of
the facts as found by the trial court and then demonstrate that even viewing the evidence in
a light most favorable to the court below, the evidence is insufficient to support the findings
of fact.999 Save our Schoolsv. BoardofEduc. Of Salt Lake City. 2005 UT 551fl0,122 P.3d
611 citing Chen v. Stewart 2004 UT 82 f76,100 P.3d 1177. As this Court has determined,
marshaling is "[a] critical requirement of appellate advocacy99 when challenging the
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sufficiency of the evidence. West Valley Citv v. Hoskins. 2002 UT App 223, 51 P.3d 52.
[T]he challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every
scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very
findings the challenger resists, and after constructing this magnificent array
of supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in the
evidence which must be sufficient to convince the appellate court that court's
finding resting upon the evidence is clearly erroneous.
Id. "Marshaled facts in an appellant's brief should correlate particular items of evidence
with the challenged findings, supporting the findings with all available evidence in the
record, and only then should appellant attempt to demonstrate how the challenged findings
are clearly erroneous." Neelv v. Bennett. 2002 UT App 189, 51 P.3d 724, cert denied, 59
P.3d 603. "Parties challenging factual findings must fully embrace the adversary's position
and play devil's advocate." Parduhn v. Bennett. 2005 UT 22,112 P.3d 495. To successfully
marshal the evidence, ".. .the party must therefore temporarily remove its own prejudices
and fully embrace the adversary's position." Harding v. BelL 2002 UT 108, 57 P.3d 1093.
It is clear, and the appellate courts have long held, that the burden of marshaling is
on the Appellant. State v. Martinez. 2002 UT App 126,47 P.3d 115. The Utah Supreme
Court has articulated the purpose behind this stringent requirement in a recent holding, as
follows:
A proper marshaling of the evidence in support of the trial court's findings of
fact promotes efficiency by avoiding a retrying of the facts and by assisting
the appellate court in its decision-making and opinion writing, and it promotes
fairness by requiring that the appellants bear the expense and time of
marshaling the evidence rather than putting the appellee in the precarious
position ofperforming the appellant's work at considerable time and expense.
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Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, 100 P.3d 1177, rehearing denied. The burden cannot be
shifted to the appellee or the appellate court.
It is important to note that "[a]n appellant challenging an ultimate finding of fact may
not simply review the evidence presented at trial or re-argue the factual case presented in
the trial court." Parduhn v. Bennett, 2005 UT 22,112 P.3d 495. The Utah Supreme Court
has specifically indicated that it will decline to address a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence if an appellant fails to meet its burden of marshaling because they ". . .merely
restate[] or review[] the evidence that supports an alternate finding or a finding contrary to
the trial court's established finding of fact." Wilson Supply. Inc. v. Fradan Mfg. Corp.. 2002
UT 94,54 P.3d 1177. The Utah Court of Appeals has declined to address a challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence when an appellant merely selected facts from trial that were most
favorable to its position, then attempted to reargue those facts on appeal. Ohline Corp. v.
Granite Mill, 849 P.2d 602 (Utah App. 1993). "[M]ere reference to where evidence
supporting verdict can be located does not constitute 'marshaling.'" Stateexrel.W.A.« 2002
UT 127, 63 P.3d 607, cert denied 123 S.Ct. 2092, 538 U.S. 1035, 155 L.Ed.2d 1065.
Additionally, unchallenged findings are assumed to be adequately supported by the record.
See, Chen v.Stewart. 2004 UT 82, f 19, 100 P.3d 1177.
In the instant case, the trial court determined that it had not received sufficient
evidence through photos, testimony, or expert testimony to award pre-and post-judgment
interest to the Appellants. The trial court explained in its oral findings that it believed that
Appellants workmanship provided to the Appellees was deficient in areas. The trial court
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determined, as a matter of law, that it had the right and responsibility to provide justice.
Appellants have failed to adequately marshal the evidence presented at trial as required by
UT. R. APP. P. 24(a)(9) and case law cited supra. Appellants simply argue case law
respecting the award of prejudgment or postjudgment interest without attempting to
overcome the trial court's explicit finding that it was without sufficient evidence to award
such. See, Brief of Appellant at pp. 12-15. In essence, the trial court did not believe the
Appellants met their burden of showing their entitlement to such an award and, without
meeting the marshaling requirement on appeal, this Court should decline to address the
challenge to the findings of the trial court and should affirm its denial of prejudgment and
postjudgment interest accordingly.
B.

The Trial Court Adequately Determined That Appellants Should Not Be
Awarded Prejudgment or Postjudgment Interest in this Matter.

Should this Court determine that the marshaling requirement was unnecessary, it
should affirm the trial court's determination on the prejudgment and postjudgment interest
in accordance with standing precedent. The 10th Circuit Court of Appeals provides helpful
guidelines when discussing and determining prejudgment interest awards. In deciding a
Utah case they stated as follows:
Under Utah law, a prejudgment interest award is proper when the damage is
complete and the loss can be measured by facts and figures; a court may only
award prejudgment interest if damages are calculable within a mathematical
certainty.
Damages that distributor suffered from customer's breach of contract were not
calculable with mathematical certainty, and thus distributor was not entitled
prejudgment interest under Utah law, although jury granted particular damages
award; distributor had not been able to calculate its damages before trial or
-16-

even during trial, distributor did not submit any evidence in support of its
claim of 35% gross profit margin, and distributor did not provide any written
support for its claimed travel costs and other expenses.
Under Utah law, a plaintiffs inability to calculate its damages accurately may
bar the award of prejudgment interest For a prejudgment interest award to
be proper under Utah law, not only must damages be calculable within a
mathematical certainty, but also the amount of loss must be fixed as of a
particular time.
Pro Axess. Inc. v. Orlux Distribution. Inc., 428 F.3d 1270 (C.A.10 (Utah) 2005). This
Court has also provided assistance in clarifying and understanding our laws here in Utah.
This Court has stated as follows:
Prejudgment interest is awarded to compensate a party for the depreciating
value of the amount owed over time and, as a corollary, to deter parties from
intentionally withholding an amount that is liquidated and owing.
For damages to be calculable with mathematical certainty, as required to award
prejudgment interest, they must be ascertained in accordance with fixed rules
of evidence and known standards of value, which the court or jury must follow
in fixing the amount rather than be guided by their best judgment in assessing
the amount to be allowed for past as well as for future injury, or for elements
that cannot be measured by any fixed standards of value.
Lefaviv.Bertoch, 994 P.2d 817 (Utah App. 2000). The Utah Supreme Court has previously
held that the denial of prejudgment interest is appropriate when the action is for equitable
relief in cases involving the invocation of foreclosure and enforcement of a contract, since
".. .consideration of the principles of equity [] address themselves to the conscience and
discretion of the trial court." Bellon v. Malnar, 808 P.2d 1089, 1097 (Utah 1991), citing
Fullmer v. Blood. 546 P.2d 606, 610 (Utah 1976).
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The issue of postjudgment interest is easily dispensed of by the fact that Appellee
satisfied the Judgment in full on the date that it was entered. Hence, even if the trial court
had awarded postjudgment interest, it would not have applied to the instant matter.
Appellants issues surrounding the denial of postjudgment interest is thus moot.
Appellants' Complaint alleges that 'the [Pjroperty is the subject of a mechanic's lien
foreclosure action herein arising out of Ron Case Roofing's having performed certain
roofing work, at the request of Peggy Sturzenegger, for which Ron Case Roofing has not
been paid in full." (Rec. p. 3, f6) Appellants alleged the first cause of action as a breach
of contract (Rec. p. 3), the second cause of action as unjust enrichment/quantum meruit, and
the fourth cause of action2 as foreclosure of lien (Rec. p. 4). Similar to Bellon v. Malnar.
this Court should decline to overturn the trial court's denial of prejudgment interest in a case
involving the principles of equity. Where the matter involves the invocation of foreclosure
and enforcement of a contract, the trial court should be given the conscience and discretion
to such determination. In the instant matter, the trial court determined that it had not
received sufficient evidence through photos, testimony, or expert testimony to award preand post-judgment interest to the Appellants. This Court should affirm its determination
since the trial court is in the best position to determine the sufficiency of the evidence as it
pertains to the award of prejudgment and postjudgment interest in actions pertaining to the
principles of equity.

2

See footnote "1" supra.
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H.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED RON CASE ROOFING'S
REQUEST TO FORECLOSE ON THE SUBJECT REAL PROPERTY TO
COLLECT ITS JUDGMENT.
A basic principal pertaining to civil litigation is that a defendant to an action may raise

any issue and assert any defense which will operate to defeat a plaintiffs claim. See, Stewart
Livestock Co. v. Ostler. 144 P.2d 276 (Utah 1943); see also, UT. R. Civ. P. 12 and 13. More
particularly in foreclosure actions, a defendant may plead defenses by way of offset or
counterclaims, and a defendant should be permitted to offset any and all damages they may
reasonably have sustained through the contractor's work. Stewart Livestock at 281. The
Utah Supreme Court has long held that a trial courts9 decision to refuse foreclosure in matters
will only occur if the trial courts' decisions are arbitrary or capricious. Walker Bank & Trust
Co. v. Neilson. 26 Utah 2d 383,490 P.2d 328 (Utah 1971).
Recognizing Appellants contribution to the causes of action alleged against the
Appellees, the trial court ordered the following with regard to the lien and foreclosure in this
matter, specifically as follows:
This judgment shall be a judgment lien on and against that certain real
Property located at approximately 1849 East 5600 South, Salt Lake City, Utah.
The Judgment lien shall relate back to and take effect as of April 22,2003, and
shall be superior to and have priority over, as a matter of time and right, any
and all encumbrances recorded against the Property subsequent thereto. The
Judgment lien shall attach to any and all interest held in and to the Property by
Peggy Sturzenegger and/or Gene Sutrzenegger.
Ron Case Roofing shall not be allowed to execute on its Judgment lien against
the Property unless and until such time as the Property is sold or otherwise
transferred. In the meantime, however, Ron Case Roofing may execute on and
against any other real and personal Property and may use all other legal means
of and methods for collecting its Judgment.
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(Final Judgment dated October 12,2005, p. 3; attached hereto as Addendum B). Moreover,
in this matter it is evident that, based upon the evidence the trial court received in this case,
it was not satisfied that foreclosure was justified and that Appellants were not entirely
faultless in the matter. For instance, the trial court heard expert testimony that the
Appellantss' second page of their contract was not common at all and was specific to Ron
Case Roofing. (Tr. 215-216). The trial court additionally heard evidence that the price for
sheeting was the "high end of the ballpark" (Tr. P. 218 lines 1-6). Furthermore, the expert
for the Appellants testified that was impossible to know how many roofs a roof has without
tearing it off. (Tr. p. 170, lines 5-25) However, the expert for Appellees, did not have that
same opinion at all. In Appellee's expert opinion, Ron Case Roofing should have been able
to tell the condition of the roof and the materials they would need without tearing off the roof
with conducting a simple visual inspection, an inspection inside the house as well as taking
test cuts from the roof in different areas. (Tr. P. 224-225). Therefore, although the trial court
entered a judgment in favor of the Appellants, it also awarded the Appellees on several of
her counterclaims. The offset did not eliminate the amount owed to Ron Case Roofing, and
thus the trial court considered it the prevailing party.
The trial court specifically stated that it was amending the Mechanics Lien to a
judgment lien, which now takes precedence over the previous lien held in this matter. As
we can see, the trial courts' decision to refuse to allow the Appellants to foreclose on the
Property was not arbitrary nor capricious. Additionally, the issue surrounding the foreclosure
is moot by the fact that Appellees satisfied the Judgment in full on the date that it was
-20-

entered, so no foreclosure was necessary to a satisfaction of either the Mechanics Lien or the
Judgment lien allowed by the trial court in its Judgment. Therefore, the trial court did not
err in refusing Appellants to foreclose on the Property in this matter.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED DAMAGES IN THE FORM
OF AN OFFSET FOR DAMAGE TO THE MASTER BEDROOM CEILING
AND WORKMANSHIP DEFICIENCIES.
"Because the adequacy of damages is a question of fact, the reviewing court cannot

overturn the trial court's findings unless they are clearly erroneous." Aris Vision Institute.
Inc. v. Wasatch Property Management. Inc.. 2005 UT App 326, 118, 121 P.3d 24, citingln
re Estate of Knickerbocker. 912 P.2d 969,981 (Utah 1996). "Appellate courts will presume
trial courts' award of damages to be correct and will overturn it only if it is clearly erroneous
with no reasonable support in evidence." Forsberg v. Burningham & Kimball. 892 P.2d 23
(Utah App. 1995). The Utah Court of Appeals reviews "the trial court's decision to award
damages under a standard which gives the court considerable discretion, and will not disturb
its ruling absent an abuse of discretion." Shar's Cars. L.L.C. v. Elder. 2004 UT App 258,
113,97 P.3d 724 citing Lvnsenko v. Sawava. 1999 UT App 31,16,973 P.2d 445. "In fixing
damages, trial court is vested with broad discretion, and award will not be set aside unless
it is manifestly unjust or indicates that the trial court neglected pertinent elements, or was
unduly influenced by prejudice or other extraneous circumstances." Mabey v. Kav Peterson
Const. Co.. Inc. 682 P.2d 287 (Utah 1984). "When a reasonable basis exists for the trial
court's award of damages, Court ofAppeals will affirm the damage award on appeal." Lefavi
v. Bertoch. 2000 UT App 5,994 P.2d 817.
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Appellants specifically set forth in their Brief of Appellant as follows:
The Utah Supreme Court has explained that to prove damages, a party must
prove (1) "the fact of damages and (2) "the amount of damages." Atkin Wright
& Miles v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 709 P.2d 330, 336 (Utah 1985).
In measuring the damages, the claimant has the burden of proving the
reasonableness of the cost of the repairs. 25 C.J.S. Damages, §144. There
"must be evidence that rises above speculation and provides a
reasonable...estimate of damages." Atkin Wright. 709 P.2d at 336. In Atkin
Wright the Utah Supreme Court reversed the jury's award of damages because
the party claiming damages, while offering sufficient proof of the fact of
damages, failed to offer sufficient proof of the amount of its damages. Id. At
337. Similarly, in the case now before the Court, Sturzenegger offered
insufficient evidence as to the amount of damages she sustained from the
damage to her master bedroom ceiling and defects in the construction of the
new roof.
(See Brief of Appellant, p. 17, %5F). Appellants, fail to provide this Court with the additional
assistance and clarity the Utah Supreme Court provided in the Atkin Wright case. The Utah
Supreme Court stated as follows:
Level of persuasiveness required to establish fact of loss in proving damages
is generally higher than that required to establish amount of loss, and while
standard for determining amount of damages is not so exacting as standard for
proving fact of damages, there still must be evidence that rises above
speculation and provides a reasonable, even though not necessarily precise,
estimate of damages....Amount of damages may be based upon
approximations, if fact of damage is established, and the approximations are
based upon reasonable assumptions or projections.
Atkin Wright & Miles v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 709 P.2d 330, 336 (Utah 1985).
Appellees under oath testified that they paid another company $3,000.00 to repair the
roof. (Tr. P. 138, line 15). Moreover, Appellees paid another Contractor after Appellees'
counsel had sent numerous letters to Ron Case Roofing asking them to repair the damage to
the ceiling. (Tr. P. 191, lines 12-16; exhibits 35 and 36; emphasis added). The trial court
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awarded an offset of $2400.00 due to the fact that Appellees failed to bring evidence to court
regarding the amount. In its determination, the trial court recognized that, had it allowed
Appellees counsel to take a recess during trial, Appellee would have been able to provide the
evidence to support the price of $3000.00. Therefore, the trial court reduced the amount of
the offset. A $600.00 deduction was reasonable considering these circumstances. Appellants
argue that because the trial court used "Kentucky Windage numbers," it mistakenly used
evidence of payment to support the amount of damages. (See Brief of Appellant, p. 19, Tfl)3Appellants, however, have failed to support with any legal authority this contention that the
trial court's determination was mistaken. Arguably, the trial court was extremely fair in
deducting $600.00 as an offset on this issue. Moreover, the trial court was within its
discretion to do so pursuant to the evidence it had before it. The trial court did not err in
awarding these damages and was very fair in its determination and deduction to both parties.

3

Appellants set forth their definition of "Kentucky Windage" infii.2 on p. 19 of their
brief; however, their definition appears abstract compared with the generally accepted definition
in researching the term online. The term appears to plainly mean a method of target shooting
where the shooter deliberately aims off-target to compensate for a moving target, weather
conditions, or just a bad sight on the rifle. See, www.shotinthedark.info/archives/004248.html;
see also, www.snipercountry.com/Compendium/Comp_K.htm ("An estimate of the modified
point of aim required to compensate for wind or for target movement.");
www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=Kentucky+Windage ("When shooting arifle,the
adjusted point of aim when compensating for wind. Theriflemanmade sure to check his
kentucky windage99); www.cyto.purdue.edu/hmarchiv/1998/1909.htm ("Kentucky windage11
refers to a skill used in firing large bore rifles at a moving target with a cross wind.);
www.hray.com/idiom/php/idiom.php?idiomid=:1928 (Nowadays, Kentucky Windage is used to
describe any situation where you go out of your way to work around a problem.). Research
conducted nationwide on Westlaw respecting the term did not present any case law contrary to
the use of this procedure herein. Regardless, any disputes among the parties as to the defining of
such a term should be left to the trial court who is in the best position to define its use of it
herein.
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Appellee sufficiently and successfully argued that the master bedroom ceiling had been
damaged by Appellants. The evidence sufficiently supported the amount of those damages.
See, Atkin Wright at 336. Appellants argument thus fails.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY OFFSET THE JUDGMENT BASED ON
POOR WORKMANSHIP BYREDUCING THE AWARD FOR ADDITIONAL
SHEETING MATERIALS FROM $1.59 PER SQUARE FOOT TO $1.25 PER
SQUARE FOOT.
The trial court found that there were there certain deficiencies with the roof system

installed by Ron Case Roofing (Rd. P. 257, f21). Moreover, expert testimony presented
evidenced that the asphalt used was inadequate, that it would not be considered a workman
like manner to puncture the ceiling of the tongue and groove of the bedroom, and that a good
contracting firm under due diligence would take steps necessary to provide an accurate bid
by conducting research through investigating the home and conducting test cuts. (Tr. P. 223224). This evidence clearly supports the trial court's determination to setoff the amount of
the sheeting in its award of damages.
Had the Appellants conducted the necessary investigation of the home prior to work
commencing, testimony evidences that the bid would have been more accurate and they
would have known that extra sheeting materials would have been needed. However,
Appellants failed to conduct the necessary research and inspection/investigation of the home
prior to commencing work. As a result of this negligence, it created excessive extra work that
needed to be done, increasing the original bid by thousands of dollars. The trial court
specifically articulated in its oral findings that it reduced the amountfrom$ 1.59 to $ 1.25 not
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as a determination that this was the cost involved in the sheeting, but rather as a type of
penalty for what he believed was unreasonable decision-making by the contractor to
undertake such a vast amount of additional work without speaking to the owner. (Tr. P. 19,
lines 18-24)
As this Court can see, the trial court specifically articulated its reasoning for its
finding and decision as to this offset and did rely upon the evidence presented. The evidence
sufficiently supported the trial court'sfindingthat it needed to somehow offset the cost based
on the faulty workmanship and it chose to do so here. The trial court's determination to
reduce the amount from $1.59 to $1.25 was reasonably supported by the evidence. See,
Forsberg v. Burningham & KimbalL 892 P.2d 23 (UT. App. 1995). The trial court is given
considerable discretion and the Appellants have failed to show any cause for this court to
disturb its Judgment. See, Shar's Cars, L.L.C. v. Elder. 2004 UT App 258, f 13,19 P.3d 724
(citation omitted).
V.

APPELLANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO HAVE THIS COURT AMEND THE
AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES TO INCLUDE THOSE INCURRED IN
THIS APPEAL.
The Utah Supreme Court in a recent decision stated as follows:
Standard of review allocates discretion between trial and appellate courts, and
in determining the appropriateness of a particular allocation of responsibility
for deciding an issue or class of issues, account should be taken of the relative
capabilities of each level of the court system to take evidence and make
findings of fact in the face of conflicting evidence, on the one hand, and to set
binding jurisdiction-wide policy, on the other... .Although the award of attorney
fees is typically a matter of law which is reviewed for correctness, where the
fees are predicated uponfindingsof fact, the award is reviewed for an abuse
of discretion...Recognizing the broad discretion given to trial courts in these
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matters, appellate court reviews a trial court's decision to grant or not to grant
attorney fees under the Utah Arbitration Act for an abuse of discretion.
Paul deGroot Bldg. Services, L.L.C. v. Gallacher, 112 P.3d 490 (Utah,2005). In Willevv.
Willey. the Utah Supreme Court overturned this Court's determination as to attorneys fees
and remanded the issue to the trial court for their analysis, finding that appellate courts
should defer the issue to ensure legal accuracy and uniformity. Ibid., 951 P.2d 226,230-231
(Utah 1997). The Utah Supreme Court has indicated that the trial court has the sound
discretion to make the determination of attorneys9 fees. Salmon v. Davis. 916 P.2d 890,892,
898 (Utah 1996).
In the instant case the trial court stated:
The Court has received and carefully reviewed plaintiffs claim for attorney's
fees. Based upon the amount of time devoted and the determination of the
Court as to a reasonable hourly rate, the Court has awarded $10,000.00. The
Court discounted the amount awarded for the following reasons: first, while
plaintiff prevailed on the basic claim, there were a number of aspects of
plaintiffs claim and defendant's Counterclaim that were not fully won by the
plaintiff; second, given the amount of the claim and the actual result obtained,
the initial attorney's fees claimed appeared to be excessive; and third, some of
the time claimed (e.g., for trial preparation and related matters) also appeared
to be excessive.
{See record p. 295, f 1). In essence, the trial court recognized the balancing of the claims in
its determination of an award of attorneys' fees in this matter. Additionally, the trial court
determined that the fees submitted by the Appellants were excessive and that some of the
time spent appeared to be excessive.
Appellants brought the matter before the trial court based upon nonpayment from
Appellees, who were attempting to settle the matter through requesting an offset from the
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Appellants for the damage incurred to the master bedroom ceiling. Having not determined
to settle, Appellants filed the suit at issue herein and Appellees were required to defend
themselves. The trial court found Appellants to be the prevailing party, although it offset the
award based upon the damages incurred by Appellees, and awarded attorneys' fees to
Appellant. Appellant then appealed the matter, again requiring Appellees to defend
themselves and the trial court's Judgment based only on the Appellant's dissatisfaction with
the amount awarded. Appellants now argue that they are entitled to additional attorneys fees
if they prevail on appeal. (See Brief of Appellant, p. 25, f2).
In some instances, a party who prevails in the trial court and prevails on appeal is
entitled to additional attorneys fees for the appeal, but it appears to only occur when it is the
defendant who prevails in the trial court and then again on appeal, not the plaintiff/appellant.
See, Sprousev.Jager, 806 P.2d 219,227 (Ut. App. 1991)("Because appellees were required
to defend their position on appeal at their own expense and because their position was based
on a contractual provision allowing for attorney fees, we follow the rule established in
Management Services Corporation, v. Development Associates, 617 P.2d 406,408-09 (Utah
1980) and followed more recently in Dixon v. Stoddard, 765 P.2d 879, 881 (Utah 1988) and
award attorney fees for the cost of appeal.").
The Appellants brought the Appellees to trial for the purpose of enforcing the
contract, prevailed at trial, and a judgment was awarded in their favor. Therefore, the
original intent of enforcing the contract is not the reason for the appeal. Appellee did not
prevail on her counterclaims, so a loss at trial is not the reason for the appeal. The trial court
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already awarded Appellant's attorney fees, and damages, which was equitable for the purpose
of enforcing the contract. Appellees are abiding by that current judgment issued by the trial
court and thus are in compliance of the court orders.
Appellees continue to have to defend themselves on appeal at their own expense, even
when Appellants have already prevailed at trial. This Court should not continue to require
Appellees, who did not prevail at trial and were forced to continue to defend themselves on
appeal, to pay Appellants' attorneys fees on appeal. Should this Court determine that the
issue of attorneys' fees needs readdressing, it should remand the matter to the proper
forum-the trial court-for determination. See, Willev.
CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, Appellees respectfully request that this
Court deny the relief sought by Appellants' on appeal and affirm the trial court's
determination in this matter.
DATED this 28th day of June, 2006.

TYLER AYRES
Attorney for Appellees
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Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

RON CASE ROOFING & ASPHALT
PAVING, L.L.C., a Utah limited liability
company,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No.: 030923024

PEGGY ANN STURZENEGGER a/k/a
PEGGY ANN JOHNSON
STURZENEGGER, an individual;
CLARENCE GENE STURZENEGGER,
an individual; and JOHN DOES 1-10,

I

Honorable John Paul Kennedy

,

Defendants.

On Tuesday, August 2, 2005, the above-captioned action came before the
Honorable Judge John Paul Kennedy on a bench trial. Plaintiff Ron Case Roofing &
Asphalt Paving, L.L.C. ("Ron Case Roofing") was represented by Jason H. Robinson
of BABCOCK SCOTT & BABCOCK. Defendants Peggy Ann Sturzenegger a/k/a Peggy Ann

Johnson Sturzenegger ("Peggy Sturzenegger") and Clarence Gene Sturzenegger
("Gene Sturzenegger") (collectively the "Sturzeneggers") were represented by Tyler B.
Ayres. Based upon the testimony and evidence presented at trial, and the pleadings,
exhibits and documents on file in the above-referenced action, the Court makes the
following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:
FINDINGS OF FACT
/.

BACKGROUND
1.

Ron Case Roofing was, at all times relevant, properly licensed with the

State of Utah, Department of Commerce, Division of Professional Licensing, as a
roofing contractor.
2.

The Sturzeneggers were, at all times relevant, a married couple.

3.

The Sturzeneggers were, at all times relevant, owners of the subject

detached single-family dwelling located at 1849 East 5600 South in Salt Lake City, Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, and further described as LOT 1, LAKEWOOD # 6 SUB.,
Parcel No. 22-16-206-011-0000 (the "Property").
4.

Peggy Sturzenegger is a high school graduate who attended Utah State

University and who holds a Utah realtor's license. Peggy Sturzenegger is not a "babe in
the woods".
5.

As part of obtaining her realtor's license, Peggy Sturzenegger attended

classes where she learned about contracts.
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THE CONTRACT
6.

In or about November 2002, Peggy Stuzenegger solicited proposals from

at least three roofing contractors, including Ron Case Roofing, for roofing services for
the Property.
7.

On or about November 19, 2002, Shain Case, a representative of Ron

Case Roofing, met with Peggy Sturzenegger and observed the existing tar and gravel
roof system at the Property.
8.

Due to the inherent nature of a roof, Shain Case was able to observe only

the surface of the roof. He was unable to observe what lie beneath the tar and gravel
surface; such as the number of existing roof systems (previous roofs applied over the
top of each other) and the condition of the existing substrate. (The substrate is the
underlying wooden deck to which the tar and gravel roof system is applied and which
supports the same).
9.

During the meeting, Shain Case prepared "Proposal and Contract No.

3R3074S" for work to be performed at the Property (the "Contract'), a copy of which

was left with Peggy Sturzenegger for her review and execution. (The Contract was
admitted into evidence at trial as Exhibit No. 6).
10.

The Court found that the Contract is fairly straight forward.

11.

The roofing services identified on the Contract included removal of the

existing roofing membrane to the roof deck, installation of a new built-up tar and gravel
3192.03
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roof system, installation of new aluminum gutters and downspouts, installation of new
high rise gravity vents, and installation of a new gravel stop (the "Work").
12.

The estimated price for the Work was $12,450.00 (the "Original Price").

13.

In addition to the Work, the Contract provided for contingencies, such as

the existence of more than one roof system needing to be removed; the substrate
needing new wood sheeting; and other conditions, which will be discussed below.
14.

The contingencies, if encountered, would increase the Original Price.

15.

Peggy Sturzenegger was aware that more than one roof system had been

installed at the Property, but did not disclose this information to Ron Case Roofing.
16.

Peggy Sturzenegger did not invite Ron Case Roofing to inspect the

interior of the Property and did not inform Ron Case Roofing that her master bedroom
had an exposed vaulted tongue-and-groove ceiling.
17.

Peggy Sturzenegger had the Contract in her possession from November

19, 2003 through April 14, 2003.
18.

Peggy Sturzenegger reviewed the Contract.

19.

On or about April 14, 2003, Peggy Sturzenegger signed the Contract.

20.

Peggy Sturzenegger signed the Contract as "Agent for Owners or Owner".

21.

Provision 1 of the Contract defines the term "Owner" as the "Owner of the

building, owner's architect, general contractor, owner's agent or others acting in behalf
of owner."
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22.

On or about April 14, 2003, Peggy Sturzenegger paid Ron Case Roofing

$6,000.00 as a deposit for the Work.
23.

Peggy Sturzenegger was aware that, pursuant to the Contract, Ron Case

Roofing was to commence the Work within ten business days.
///.

THE WORK AND EXISTING CONDITIONS
24.

On Wednesday, April 22, 2003 (within ten business days), Ron Case

Roofing traveled to the Property to commence the Work.
25.

Ron Case Roofing arrived at the Property with two trucks, a roofing kettle,

at least one dumpster, and other roofing equipment.
26.

The trucks had Ron Case Roofing decals on them.

27.

Ron Case Roofing needed to place a dumpster in the driveway at the

Property.
28.

Ron Case Roofing's foreman knocked on the door of the Property,

introduced himself as a representative of Ron Case Roofing, and asked if there were
any cars in the garage that needed to be moved before Ron Case Roofing placed the
dumpster in the driveway (which would block access to the garage) and commenced
the Work.
29.

Peggy Sturzenegger moved her car so that Ron Case Roofing could

mobilize on the Property and commence the Work.
30.
3192 03
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31.

Peggy Sturzenegger did not tell Ron Case Roofing where she was going

or when she would return.
32.

Ron Case Roofing personnel believed that Peggy Sturzenegger would be

returning shortly, so they continued mobilizing and commenced the Work.
33.

Peggy Sturzenegger was aware that Ron Case Roofing was mobilizing on

the Property to commence the Work.
34.

Ron Case Roofing subsequently learned that Peggy Sturzenegger was, in

fact, leaving for Hawaii and would be away from the Property for three days. (This was
learned after Peggy Sturzenegger's return from Hawaii).
35.

Peggy Sturzenegger did not inform Ron Case Roofing that she was

leaving for Hawaii and did not instruct Ron Case Roofing to suspend performing the
Work.
36.

Peggy Sturzenegger could have contacted Ron Case Roofing at anytime

to inform them of her travel plans.
37.

The Contract sets forth Ron Case Roofing's office telephone number

(upper left hand corner), office fax number (upper left hand corner), and Shain Case's
personal cell phone number (upper right hand corner).
38.

Ron Case Roofing's office telephone number is also published in the Salt

Lake City telephone directory.
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39.

Provision 21 of the Contract states in pertinent part that the "Contractor

will proceed with the work once it is commenced on a continual basis...."
40.

It is important that roofing work be performed on a continual basis so as to

avoid exposing the open roof to the elements, etc.
41.

There was rainfall around the time Ron Case Roofing performed the Work

and the Extra Work.
42.

Upon removal of the first layer of tar and gravel roofing system, Ron Case

Roofing discovered an additional, previous roof system layer covering the roof surface,
which Ron Case Roofing had to remove.
43.

Provision 10 of the Contract provides: "If tear off is required, this bid price

is based on one roof removal. If more than one roof exists, there will be an added
charge of .45 cents per square foot for each additional roof to be removed."
44.

Upon removal of the tar and gravel roofing systems, Ron Case Roofing

observed the existing roof deck and its condition.
45.

Ron Case Roofing determined that the existing roof deck was in

unsatisfactory condition for installation of the new built-up tar and gravel roof system.
46.

The International Building Code, which has been adopted by Utah,

provides at Section 1510.2 as follows:
Structural and construction loads. Structural roof components shall be
capable of supporting the roof-covering system and the material and
equipment loads that will be encountered during installation of the system.
3192.03
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47.

At the time of this determination, Peggy Stuzenegger was not at the

Property and could not be otherwise contacted.
48.

At the time of this determination, no one having information on Peggy

Sturzenegger's whereabouts was at the Property.
49.

At no time while performing the Work did Ron Case Roofing have a

telephone number where Peggy Sturzenegger could be reached or any other means of
contacting her.
50.

Provision 13 of the Contract provides as follows:

If a problem should arise and workmen cannot contact Customer,
Contractor will proceed with job utilizing Contractor's best judgment. In
the event that additional costs are incurred by Contractor under these
circumstances, Customer authorizes Contractor to proceed with the
project and agrees to pay any increase in costs.
51.

Because Peggy Sturzenegger was unavailable, Shain Case, of Ron Case

Roofing, took photographs of the roof, using a digital camera, so that Ron Case Roofing
could show Peggy Sturzenegger that there was more than one roof system on the
Property and that the substrate was in poor condition and in need of new sheeting.
52.

Ron Case Roofing's foreman was present when the photographs of the

roof at the Property were taken.
53.

Ron Case Roofing, using its best judgment, determined that the substrate

needed new sheeting to support the new built-up tar and gravel roof system and the
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material and equipment loads that would be encountered during the installation of the
system.
54.

Ron Case Roofing installed new 7/16" OSB sheeting over the existing roof

deck, which provided a satisfactory roof deck surface for installation of the new built-up
tar and gravel roof system.
55.

The terms of the Contract provide in pertinent part: "Sheeting will be

inspected for damage and replaced if needed at $1.59 per square foot."
56.

At trial, both experts testified that $1.59 was a reasonable amount to be

charged for the sheeting.
57.

At trial, there was no evidence presented as to a different amount that

should have been charged, other than the $1.59 amount set forth in the Contract, for
the sheeting.
58.

In addition to removing the extra roof system and installing the new

sheeting, Ron Case Roofing determined, using its best judgment, that the following
extra work needed to be performed:
A.

Upon removal of the evaporative cooler from the roof, Ron Case

Roofing discovered that the existing metal base upon which the evaporative
cooler sits had rusted out and was inadequate to support the evaporative cooler.
Ron Case Roofing constructed and installed a box to support the evaporative
cooler.
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B.

During the Work, Ron Case Roofing discovered that three large

pipe flashings had rusted out and were in need of replacement. Ron Case
Roofing replaced these three large pipe flashings with new large pipe flashings.
C.

During the Work, Ron Case Roofing discovered that behind the

roof fascia at a corner of the Property a portion of the wood had rotted away.
Ron Case Roofing furnished new wood and performed carpentry work to repair
this area of the roof.
D.

Peggy Sturzenegger requested three extra downspouts. Ron Case

Roofing furnished these three extra downspouts.
E.

Ron Case Roofing was required to furnish an extra dumpster at the

Property to contain and haul away the construction debris.
59.

The work described in paragraphs 42 through 58 is hereinafter sometimes

referred to as the "Extra Work".
60.

The Extra Work performed by Ron Case Roofing increased the Original

Price, as provided for by the Contract.
61.

On or about Friday, April 25, 2003, Ron Case Roofing completed the

Work and the Extra Work, pursuant to the terms of the Contract.
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IV.

THE BILLING STATEMENT
62.

On or about April 25, 2003, Shain Case provided to Peggy Sturzenegger a

billing statement (the "Billing Statement"). (The Billing Statement was admitted into
evidence at trial as Exhibit No. 10).
63.

The Billing Statement states a balance due of $16,578.00 for the Work

and Extra Work, as follows:
I $12,450.00
$1,800.00
$7,314.00
$285.00
$267.00
$85.00
$177.00
$200.00
($.6000.00)
| $16,578.00
64.

Original Price for Work
Tear off and remove 4,000 square feet of extra roofing at .45 cents per
square foot
Install 4,600 square feet of sheeting at $1.59 per square foot
Construct and install cooler box
Install three extra large pipe flashings
Perform extra carpentry work
Furnish and install three extra downspouts at $59.00 each
Furnish an extra dumpster
Down payment
Total principal balance owed
Peggy Sturzenegger has not paid to Ron Case Roofing any of the Invoice

balance of $16,578.00.
65.

Peggy Sturzenegger admitted in her Answer to Ron Case Roofing's

Complaint that some monies are owed to Ron Case Roofing for the Work. See
Answer, fl 22 ("Admits that an amount is due Ron Case Roofing.")
V.

THE MASTER BEDROOM DAMAGE
66.

The master bedroom of the Property had an exposed vaulted, wood,

tongue-and-groove ceiling.
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67.

As explained above, Peggy Sturzenegger did not inform Ron Case

Roofing that she had an exposed vaulted tongue-and-groove ceiling in her master
bedroom.
68.

She also did not invite Ron Case Roofing to inspect the interior of the

Property.
69.

Provision 19 of the Contract provides in pertinent part:

Unless Customer requests Contractor's employee to inspect the interior
surfaces of the building before roofing is commenced by Contractor it will
be assumed that the interior damages were caused prior to
commencement of roof work by Contractor and owner agrees to hold
Contractor harmless for such damages.
70.

When Ron Case Roofing personnel inspected the roof of the Property,

they had no reason to know that there was an exposed vaulted tongue-and-groove
ceiling over the master bedroom.
71.

Most homes have insulation above the ceiling. The insulation is typically

installed in the interior of the home in the void under the roof substrate and above the
ceiling. With an exposed vaulted tongue-and-groove ceiling, there is no such void.
Consequently, there is typically a layer of rigid insulation installed on the exterior of the
home over the top of the roofs substrate.
72.

The Property did not have a layer of insulation on the roof over the master

bedroom.
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73.

The nails used for installation of the new sheeting pierced the master

bedroom ceiling.
74.

When Ron Case Roofing began installing a new roof vent, it cut through

the master bedroom ceiling and discovered that the master bedroom had an exposed
vaulted tongue-and-groove ceiling.
75.

On or about April 25, 2003, Peggy Sturzenegger returned to the Property

and saw the condition of the master bedroom ceiling.
76.

Peggy Sturzenegger contacted Shain Case regarding the condition of the

master bedroom ceiling.
77.

Provision 17 of the Contract states in pertinent part that if there is "[a]ny

damage caused by Contractor for which Contractor may be liable . . ., Contractor shall
be given first opportunity to repair said damage before other Contractors are retained
by owner."
78.

On or about June 13, 2003, Ron Case Roofing, through counsel and by

letter, communicated to the Sturzeneggers' attorney, its readiness and willingness to
repair the master bedroom ceiling pursuant to provision 17 of the Contract. (The letter
was admitted into evidence at trial as Exhibit No. 12).
79.

Ron Case Roofing suggested several options for repairing the master

bedroom ceiling.
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80.

Ron Case Roofing estimated that its cost to repair the master bedroom

ceiling would be $1,500.00.
81.

Peggy Sturzenegger refused to allow Ron Case Roofing make any repairs

to the master bedroom ceiling.
82.

Peggy Sturzenegger also refused to allow Ron Case Roofing to perform

any clean-up work related to the master bedroom ceiling.
83.

On or about July 29, 2003, Peggy Sturzenegger contracted with Scorpion

of Salt Lake ("Scorpion") to make repairs to the master bedroom ceiling in exchange
for payment in the amount of $3,000.00.
84.

Provision 16 of the Contract provides that "[n]o cost of service, materials,

or goods supplied by owner or owner's agent, Contractor, or employees shall be
charged back against Contractor's invoice, unless such services, goods, or materials
were furnished to Contractor or its employees, pursuant to Purchase Order issued by
Contractor."
85.

Peggy Sturzenegger never requested a Purchase Order for use of

Scorpion to repair the master bedroom ceiling, and a Purchase Order was never issued
by Ron Case Roofing for such.
86.

On or about July 29, 2003, Scorpion of Salt Lake made the repairs to the

master bedroom ceiling.
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87.

At trial, Ron Case Roofing remained willing to deduct its estimated cost of

$1,500.00 from the outstanding contract balance for the master bedroom ceiling
repairs.
W.

THE ALLEGED LEAK
88.

In March of 2004, Peggy Sturzenegger contacted Ron Case Roofing

regarding an alleged leak in the roof at the Property.
89.

On or about March 18, 2004, Ron Case Roofing inspected the roof at the

Property for leakage by disbursing water on the roof.
90.

After Ron Case Roofing began disbursing water on the roof, Peggy

Sturzenegger demanded that Ron Case Roofing stop its inspection, claiming she was
concerned about her water bill.
91.

At trial, Ron Case Roofing's expert testified that the leak complained of by

Pe99y Sturzenegger was not a problem with the roof system installed by Ron Case
Roofing.
92.
VII.

At trial, there was no evidence presented that the roof was still leaking.

THE MECHANIC'S LIEN
93.

Because Ron Case Roofing was not paid in full for the Work and Extra

Work, it caused a Notice of Mechanic's Lien to be filed against the Property (the
"Lien"), a copy of which is attached to Ron Case Roofing's Complaint as Exhibit "Bw.
94.
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95.

The Lien was mailed to the Sturzeneggers, by certified mail, at the

Property on June 13, 2003.
96.

The Sturzeneggers received the certified mailing at the Property and on or

about June 18, 2003, and Gene Sturzenegger signed for the same.
VIII.

INTEREST
97.

Provision 2 of the Contract states in pertinent part as follows:

In the event payments are not timely made, a finance charge of 3% per
month will be charged on the unpaid balance from the date of completion
to the date of payment before and after judgment.
IX.

ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
98.

Provision 2 of the Contract states in pertinent part as follows:

Customer agrees to pay all cost of collection and attorney's fees after
default and referral to attorney and further agrees to pay after judgment
costs of collection.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The foregoing Findings of Fact are incorporated herein by this reference.
/.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION: BREACH OF CONTRACT
1.

Ron Case Roofing was, at all times relevant, a licensed contractor.

2.

Pursuant to the Contract, Ron Case Roofing agreed to perform the Work

for the Original Price of $12,450.00.
3.

Peggy Sturzenegger agreed to pay the amount of $12,450.00 for the

Work.
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4.

In addition to the Work, the Contract provided for contingencies including,

but not limited to, the following:
A.

If there was more than one roof system, Peggy Sturzenegger

agreed to pay .45 cents per square foot for removal of the same.
B.

If the existing substrate needed new sheeting, Peggy Sturzenegger

agreed to pay $1.59 per square foot for the replacement of the same.
C.

If there were problems requiring extra work, and Ron Case Roofing

was unable to contact Peggy Sturzenegger, Peggy Sturzenegger agreed that
Ron Case Roofing could proceed with the work, using its best judgment, and
Peggy Sturzenegger agreed to pay for any such work so performed.
5.

At trial, Ron Case Roofing claimed it was owed the following amounts:

M I $12,450.00
2 $1,800.00
3
4
5
6
7
8

$7,314.00
$285.00
$267.00
$85.00
$177.00
$200.00
($.6000.00)
($1,500.00)
$15,078.00
6.

Original Price for Work
Tear off and remove 4,000 square feet of extra roofing at .45 cents
per square foot
Install 4,600 square feet of sheeting at $1.59 per square foot
Construct and install cooler box
Install three extra large pipe flashings
Perform extra carpentry work
Furnish and install three extra downspouts at $59.00 each
Furnish an extra dumpster
Down payment
I
Ron Case Roofing's estimated cost to repair master bedroom ceiling
Total principal balance owed_
_
J

The Court found that Ron Case Roofing performed the Work and the

Extra Work set forth in the Billing Statement, as outlined above.
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7.

The Court found that Ron Case Roofing was entitled to the full amounts

sought, and set forth above in paragraph 5, with the exception of items 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7.
8.

As to item number 3, the Court found that Peggy Sturzenegger should be

required to pay $1.25 per square foot for the sheeting, instead of $1.59 per square foot
as set forth in the Contract.
9.

As to items 4-7, the Court found that Peggy Sturzennger should not be

required to pay for the same.
10.

The Court found that Ron Case Roofing is entitled to the following

principal amounts under its breach of contract cause of action:
I $12,450.00
$1,800.00
$5,750.00
$0
$0
$0
$0
$200.00
($,6000.00)
($1,500.00)
[$12,700.00
11.

Original Price for Work
Tear off and remove 4,000 square feet of extra roofing at .45 cents
per square foot
Install 4,600 square feet of sheeting at $1.59 per square foot
Construct and install cooler box
Install three extra large pipe flashings
Perform extra carpentry work
Furnish and install three extra downspouts at $59.00 each
Furnish an extra dumpster
Down payment
I
Ron Case Roofing's estimated cost to repair master bedroom ceiling
Total principal balance owed
|
The Court found that failure to pay Ron Case Roofing the amounts

referenced above in paragraph 10, when they became due and owing, constitutes a
material breach of contract for which Ron Case Roofing is entitled to recover.
12.
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13.

Pursuant to the Contract, Ron Case Roofing is entitled to an award of its

costs of collection, including attorney fees.
//.

OFFSET
14.

Peggy Sturzenegger claimed offsets for the damage to her master

bedroom ceiling and for alleged deficiencies in the roof system installed by Ron Case
Roofing.
A.

Master Bedroom Ceiling.

15.

Ron Case Roofing had a right, pursuant to the Contract, to repair the

damage to the master bedroom ceiling.
16.

Ron Case Roofing requested that it be allowed to repair the damage to

the master bedroom ceiling.
17.

Peggy Sturzenegger refused to allow Ron Case Roofing to repair the

damage to the master bedroom ceiling.
18.

The Court found that Peggy Sturzenegger went off and did her own thing.

19.

There was no evidence presented at trial that the $3,000.00 paid by

Peggy Sturzenegger for repair of the master bedroom ceiling was a reasonable amount.
20.

The Court, using "Kentucky windage" numbers granted Peggy

Sturzenegger an offset of $2,400.00 (which included the $1,500.00 that Ron Case
Roofing voluntarily deducted from its claim as its estimated cost to repair the master
bedroom ceiling).
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B.

Deficiencies with Roof System.

21.

The Court found that there were certain deficiencies with the roof system

installed by Ron Case Roofing.
22.

There was no evidence presented at trial as to the dollar value of the

deficiencies.
23.

The Court, using "Kentucky windage" numbers, granted Peggy

Struzenegger an offset of $1,500.00.
24.

With the offsets, set forth above, the Court found that Ron Case Roofing

is owed the principal amount of $10,264.00.
///.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION: UNJUST ENRICHMENT/ QUANTUM MERUIT
(in the alternative to the first cause of action for breach of contract)
25.

Pursuant to the terms of the Contract, Peggy Sturzenegger requested that

Ron Case Roofing perform the Work and the Extra Work.
26.

Ron Case Roofing performed the Work and the Extra Work.

27.

The Work and Extra Work benefited and improved the Property and

conferred a benefit upon Peggy Sturzenegger and the Property.
28.

Ron Case Roofing performed the Work and the Extra Work with the

expectation of being compensated for the reasonable value thereof and has not acted
as a volunteer or intermeddler.
29.

To permit Peggy Sturzenegger and the Property to retain the benefit of

the Work and Extra Work without compensating Ron Case Roofing for the same would
3192.03
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result in unjust enrichment of Peggy Sturzenegger and the Property at the expense of
Ron Case Roofing, which should not be allowed.
30.

The reasonable value of the Work and Extra Work, less the offsets set

forth above, is $10,264.00.
IV.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION: FORECLOSURE OF LIEN
31.

Ron Case Roofing performed the Work and the Extra work at the request

of Peggy Sturzenegger.
32.

The Court found that Peggy Sturzenegger was the "owner" of the

Property.
33.

Ron Case Roofing's Complaint provides, at paragraph 5, as follows:

Peggy Sturzenegger entered into a contract with Ron Case Roofing, a
copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" (the "Contract"), to have
certain roofing work, as set forth in the Contract, performed for an existing
detached single-family dwelling situated upon real property owed by the
Sturzenegqers and located at approximately 1849 East 5600 South, Salt
Lake City, Utah, and more specifically described as follows:
LOT 1, LAKEWOOD #6 SUB.
Parcel No. 22-16-206-011-0000
(Emphasis added).
34.

Peggy Sturzenegger, in her Answer to Ron Case Roofing's Complaint,

admitted the allegations set forth in paragraph 5 of Ron Case Roofing's Complaint.
35.

Gene Sturzenegger, in his Answer to Ron Case Roofing's Complaint,

admitted the allegations set forth in paragraph 5 of Ron Case Roofing's Complaint.
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36.

At trial, Ron Case Roofing's counsel explained, based upon the Complaint

and Answer filed in the above-captioned action, that the Sturzeneggers admitted that at
all relevant times they were both owners of the Property.
37.

Ron Case Roofing's counsel also explained that the Sturzeneggers had

not amended their respective Answers.
38.

The Sturzeneggers did not attempt to amend their respective Answers at

39.

The Court took judicial notice of the Sturzeneggers' admission that they

trial.

were, at all times relevant, both owners of the Property.
40.

Counsel for the Sturzeneggers stipulated that the Court could take judicial

notice of the Sturzeneggers' admission that they were, at all times relevant, both
owners of the Property.
41.

Based upon the Court's taking take judicial notice of the Sturzeneggers'

admission that they were, at all times relevant, both owners of the Property, Ron Case
Roofing's counsel forwent questioning the witnesses regarding ownership and authority
to contract under Utah's mechanic's lien statute.
42.

Ron Case Roofing caused the Lien to be recorded on June 13, 2003,

within ninety days of Ron Case Roofing's last date of performing work on the Property,
in compliance with Utah Code Section 38-1-7.

3192.03

22

43.

Ron Case Roofing sent a copy of the Lien, by certified mail, to Mr.

Sturzenegger on June 13, 2003, within thirty days of the date the Lien was filed, in
compliance with Utah Code Section 38-1-7.
44.

Ron Case Roofing filed the instant foreclosure action on October 17,

2003, within 180 days of its last work, in compliance with Utah Code 38-1-11.
V.

JUDGMENT LIEN
45.

The Court found that Ron Case Roofing is entitled to a judgment lien

against the Property.
46.

The judgment lien shall relate back to and take effect as of April 22, 2003,

and shall be superior to and have priority over, as a matter of time and right, any and all
encumbrances recorded against the Property subsequent thereto.
47.

The judgment lien shall attach to any and all interest held in and to the

Property by Peggy Sturzenegger and/or Gene Sturzenegger.
48.

Ron Case Roofing shall not be allowed to execute on its judgment lien

against the Property.
49.

Ron Case Roofing may, however, execute against any other property and

may use all other legal means of and methods for collecting its Judgment.
50.

Ron Case Roofing will be allowed to execute on its judgment lien against

the Property in the event the Property is ever sold or otherwise transferred.
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DATED this Is

day of

<*ZJLt'

.2005.

BY THE COURT:
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NOTICE TO PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL
You are hereby notified that pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 7(f)(2), any
objections to these Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law shall be filed within five (5)
days of service hereof, together with any additional time provided for by Utah Rule of
Civil Procedure 6(e). Upon the earlier of being served with an objection to the proposed
order or expiration of the time to object, counsel for Plaintiff will file these Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law with the Court.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 4 ^ h day of August, 2005, a true and correct copy of
the foregoing document was served by the method indicated below, to the following:
Tyler B. Ayres
3267 East 3300 South, #126
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
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Addendum ~B~
FinalJudgment, dated October 13, 2005
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH

RON CASE ROOFING & ASPHALT PAVINO, t
L.L.C, a Utah limited liability
company,
:
Plaintiff,

FINAL JUDGMENT
CASE NO.

030923024

i

FILEBDISTilCTCQUBT
Third Judicial Dfstrict

vs.
PEGGY ANN STURZENEGGER, aka
s
PEGGY ANN JOHNSON STURZENEGGER, an
individual; CLARENCE GENE
:
STURZENEGGER, an i n d i v i d u a l ; and
JOHN DOES 1 - 1 0 ,

QCT \ 0 OHAC
*UUD

:

*AtrLAKECa*rf?
l
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DiputyCtork

Defendants.

:

ENTERED IN REGISTRY
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On Tuesday, August 2, 2005, the above-captioned action came before
the Honorable John Paul Kennedy on a bench trial.

Plaintiff Ron Case

Roofing & Asphalt Paving, L.L.C. (uRon Case Roofing"), was represented
by Jason H. Robinson of Babcock, Scott & Babcock.

Defendants Peggy Ann

Sturzenegger, aka Peggy Ann Johnson Sturzenegger (uPeggy Sturzenegger")
and Clarence Gene Sturzenegger (nGene Sturzenegger") (collectively the
"Sturzeneggers") were represented by Tyler B. Ayres.
The Court, having reviewed all pleadings and Memoranda on file in
the above-captioned action and the authorities cited therein, having
taken evidence, having considered the arguments of counsel, and having
made findings of fact and conclusions of law, and being fully advised in
the premises, hereby orders, adjudges and decrees, as follows:

rTWOt

RON CASE ROOFING
V. STURZENEGGER
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FINAL JUDGMENT

ATTORNEYS FEES
The Court has received and carefully reviewed plaintiff's claim for
attorney's fees.

Based upon the amount of time devoted and the

determination of the Court as to a reasonable hourly rate, the Court has
awarded $10,000.

The Court discounted the amount awarded for the

following reasons: first, while plaintiff prevailed on the basic claim,
there were a number of aspects of plaintiff's claim and defendants'
Counterclaim that were not fully won by the plaintiff; second, given the
amount of the claim and

the actual

result

obtained,

the initial

attorney's fees claimed appeared to be excessive; and third, some of the
time claimed

(e.g., for trial preparation and related matters) also

appeared to be excessive.
JUDGMENT
Judgment is hereby entered in favor of Ron Case Roofing and against
defendant Peggy Sturzenegger, as follows:
Principal

$10,264.00

Costs

487.65

Attorney's fees

10,000.00
Total Judgment

$20,751.65

IT IS ORDERED, pursuant to Utah Code Ann., Section 15-1-4(3), that
interest shall accrue at the rate of 4.82% per annum from the date this
Judgment is entered until this Judgment is paid in full.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED/' that this judgment shall be augmented in the
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Judgment, as shall be established by Affidavit.
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lien on and against that certain real property located at approximately
l! 84,9 East

5600

South.,

Sal t

Lake

City,

Utah,

and

more

specifically

described as follows:
L 0 T

^

L A K E W 0 0 D

#6

SUB^

Parcel N o . 22-16-2'06-OH-OOOO
adgment xien sha] "I i: elate back to and take effect
as uf April -
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be superior

:

> and have priority over,

as a matter of time and right, any and all encumbrances recorded against
the Property subsequem

•• ihn.lijiiit'ijl

and a I! interest held

I mi K
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Property by Peggy Sturzenegger and/or

Gene Sturzenegger.
Ron Case Roofing shall not be allowed
lien against
sold

or
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otherwise

IIHI

I

transferred

M;S
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execute

Judgment

"' < '
meantime,

i i V is,
however,

Ron

Case

Roofing may execute on and against any other real and personal property
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and may use all other legal means of and methods for collecting J ts
Judgment
Dated this

^-^^ day of October, 2005

^CJ-0^
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Final Judgment, to the following, this,
2005:

Robert F. Babcock
Jason H. Robinson
Attorneys for Plaintiff
505 East 200 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Tyler B. Ayres
Attorney for Defendants
3267 East 3300 South, Suite 126
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109

.day of October,

